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Abstract
We analyze ￿rst-order beliefs in a variation of the Public Good Game.
We show that (1) the role that belief elicitation plays in the experiment
a⁄ects both the contribution behavior and beliefs, and (2) framing in-
￿ uences stated beliefs, as much as contribution behavior. In the second
part of the paper, we study the role of heterogeneity in the formation
of initial beliefs, and provide an empirical model of the belief up-dating
process. Subjects use the past experience, stressing the role of experience
that comes from situations similar to the current ones.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide a large experimental analysis of ￿rst-order
beliefs. First-order beliefs can be, informally, de￿ned as expectations of players
about how others will play a particular game. The issues, we explore here,
concern the importance of beliefs for payo⁄s, the framing e⁄ects, and the role of
individual heterogeneity in belief formation and evolution. In our experiment,
we use a classic experimental protocol of Public Good Game.
Our study stem from Iturbe-Ormaetxe [10], who study framing e⁄ects in
a variation of Public Good Game and whose experimental design we borrow.
Nevertheless, our study di⁄ers with respect to theirs. Since their purpose is to
study the contribution behavior, while we completely focus on beliefs, to their
two treatments, we add another dimension with respect to the importance beliefs
have in the experiment. The second crucial di⁄erence is the role of heterogeneity.
They only use the individual heterogeneity to control for individual e⁄ects in the
estimations. Hence, the heterogeneity plays a secondary role in their analysis.
This changes in our paper. We use the socio-demographic data and pro-social
attitudes of our experimental subjects as a primary aspect to explain belief
formation and evolution.
In the ￿rst step, we show how belief elicitation a⁄ects both the contribution
behavior and stated beliefs. To this aim, we perform 4 "degrees" of belief
elicitation, concerning the importance of beliefs in experimental payo⁄s. In one
treatment, beliefs are not elicited; in another one, we elicit subjects￿￿rst-order
beliefs, but we do not use pecuniary incentives for their precision; as next degree,
we elicit beliefs and incentivize them, in case they are correct; we call the last
degree belief play, where subjects only state their beliefs, whereas the decision
whether to contribute or not is calculated as a best response to the stated belief,
assuming that subjects are self-interested and risk neutral. Note that from the
￿rst to the last design, we gradually increase the importance of beliefs in the
experimental design. For example, in the ￿rst case, beliefs do not play any role,
whereas in the last one, all the game is played via beliefs.
In a closely related research, Gachter and Renner [9] report that, in standard
lineal Public Good Game, incentivizing beliefs increases their accuracy, whereas
the average level of beliefs is not a⁄ected. Moreover, the elicitation of beliefs
increases contribution.1
Second issue we explore is the framing e⁄ect on beliefs. There has been
a vast amount of literature studying framing e⁄ects in the play,2 while only
little has been done concerning beliefs. An exception is Dufwenberg et al. [6]
who explore the e⁄ects of reference points on beliefs in a one-shot Public Good
Game. They observe that people expect their opponent to contribute more in
the standard Public Good Game framing. As well as Dufwenberg et al., we
run treatments with low reference point that correspond to standard Public
1In contrast, Nyarko and Schotter [13] reports that, in their experiment, belief elicitation
have no e⁄ect on observed behavior in a constant-sum game.
2See, for instance, Andreoni [1], Brandts and Schwieren [3], Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. [10] and
Sonnemans et al. [14] who all discuss e⁄ects of the reference point in public good provision.
2Good Game framing, and treatments with high reference point, which, in our
experiment, di⁄er in that the public good exists in the beginning and subjects
have to contribute in order to preserve it.
Third, the experimental design of Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. [10] allows to check
whether experimental subjects use irrelevant information while creating belief
about opponents play. More precisely, the costs of contribution are randomly
generated and independent across rounds and agents. While the e⁄ect of contri-
bution costs on contribution decision is straightforward, there is no information
in the subject￿ s own cost about the possible behavior of her opponents though.3
In the second part of the paper, we react to the fear of Nyarko and Schotter
[13] that beliefs ￿are not available outside of laboratory and hence out-of-sample
predictions would be di¢ cult to make.￿In this respect, we propose two econo-
metric models. The ￿rst model attempt to use the questionnaire data to model
the initial, pre-play beliefs of experimental subjects. We argue that the data
elicited via questionnaire are more likely to be observable in real-life situations
than beliefs. This would allow for a larger applicability of belief-based models
even in one-shot situations.
The second model analyzes the belief updating process. Attanassi and Nagel
[2], for instance, report that, in a coordination-like game, if a player believes that
another player cooperates with a certain probability and she, actually, does, the
￿rst player￿ s predicted probability of cooperation of the next opponent increases.
This illustrates a possible in￿ uence of past play on current beliefs. Alternatively,
Nyarko and Schotter [13] observes that, in a 2￿2 constant-sum game, predicted
high probability of an action in an experimental round induces a low predicted
probability of the same action in next round. Thus, belief might also play an
important role in belief up-dating. We analyze these hypothesis on our data.
There are two crucial di⁄erences of our paper from the literature analyzing
beliefs in public good provision. First, we play a variation of the Public Good
Game. In this game, a certain number of contributing individuals has to be
reached to provide the public good. This implies that if an agent is pivotal, self-
interested individuals prefer to contribute, leading to a multiplicity of equilibria.
This design creates a more complex strategic environment, which makes the role
of ￿rst-order beliefs more relevant for the play.4 This contrasts with standard
lineal Public Good Game, where the beliefs are not as relevant as in the threshold
version.5 It has been observed that such variation increases the frequency of
contributions (Ledyard [11]) and this is also con￿rmed in our case (see Iturbe-
Ormaetxe et al. [10] for a more detailed discussion on contribution behavior).
Second, we base the interpretation of our experimental results on the het-
erogeneity of agents. Traditionally, the experimental literature treats subjects
3The phenomenon of using irrelevant information in decision processes has already been
observed and is known as anchoring e⁄ect (Tversky and Kahneman [15]).
4This is very well illustrated by Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. [10], who show that, in the same
experimental protocol, the belief of being pivotal is one of the main driving forces for con-
tributing.
5On the other hand, this deviation from the standard Public Good Game protocol is small
enough to still allow for direct comparisons with the original game.
3as homogeneous. In our models, we use the questionnaire data when we explain
the observed ￿rst-order beliefs, and show that the same types of individuals
might state di⁄erent beliefs, depending on the prevailing experimental design.
In what follows, we brie￿ y reviews the main ￿ndings.
We reproduce most of the ￿ndings of Gachter and Renner [9]: belief elic-
itation increases contributions and the incentivizing of the accuracy of beliefs
increases lead to slightly better predictions. In contrast to Gachter and Renner,
incentivizing a⁄ects the distribution of beliefs in our experiment.
Concerning the e⁄ect of reference point, we report that this framing a⁄ects
both the initial, pre-play beliefs and the belief up-dating process. Our evidence
goes against the ￿ndings of Dufwenberg et al. [6]. The high reference point
induces higher beliefs, including the belief experimental subjects hold in the
￿rst round.6 As for the anchoring of stated beliefs on irrelevant information the
own contribution cost provides about the possible play of opponents, we report
a persistent negative relation between the costs and stated beliefs. This relation
is present in all treatments.
Our ￿ndings concerning framing and anchoring e⁄ects support the argument
of Dufwenberg et al. [6]. They suggest that beliefs, rather than directly pref-
erences, can be the way framing can enter into the decision process, and we
show that the same might matter for the anchoring of decisions on irrelevant
information.
In Section 3.3.1, we show that, contrary to the fear of Nyarko and Schotter
[13], we can explain a large fraction on the variation of initial stated beliefs on
basis of variables that are more likely to be observable in real life situations.7
Hence, the explicative variables account for a large fraction of the variability of
stated beliefs. The analysis of the belief up-dating process con￿rms that past
play of opponents and past beliefs matter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes
the experimental design. Section 3 is divided into 2 parts. In the ￿rst part,
we present the experimental ￿ndings, using simple descriptive statistics. After-
wards, we proceed to a more complex statistical analysis in Subsection 3.3. The
last section concludes and provides suggestions for further research.
2 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of the experiment in detail.
2.1 Subjects
The experiment was conducted twice, one in December 2005 and another one
in February 2007. In total, we run 4 sessions in 2005 and 8 sessions in 2007. A
total of 288 students from various ￿elds (24 per session) were recruited among
6The only exception are the non-incentivized belief treatment. See below for more details.
7The McKelvey and Zavoina￿ s R2, the most suitable measure of ￿t for ordered categorical
dependent variables (Long [12]), reaches 0.96.
4the undergraduate student population of the University de Alicante with no (or
very little) prior exposure to game theory.
The experiment was computerized, using the experimental software z-Tree
(Fischbacher [7]). Instructions were provided by a self-paced, interactive com-
puter program that introduced and described the experiment. Subjects were
also provided with a written copy of the experimental instructions, identical
to what they were reading on the screen.8 A particular care was devoted in
explaining the two di⁄erent treatments (i.e. the two frames), and, in the belief
treatment (see below), the algorithm the computer uses to calculate the best
response.
2.2 Game Form
The game played in each round of the experiment is a threshold version of the
Public Good Game. In this game, agents are distributed to groups of 3 and,
once assigned to a group, they have to decide whether they want to contribute
or not. The contribution is costly. Anytime, an agent decides to contribute
she has to pay a cost c. After all the members of the group decide their con-
tribution behavior, the computer counts the number of contributing agents. If
this number falls short of the number required, k, that appears on the screen of
each subject￿ s computer before she makes her decision, the public good is not
provided. Otherwise, the public good, worth 50; is provided to all members of
the group, independently of whether they contributed or not. The cost of con-
tributing, c, was, for all subjects and rounds, an independent draw c s U[0;c];
with c = 55 pesetas.
Let time interval ￿i = f3(i ￿ 1) < t ￿ 3(i)g; i = 1;:::;8; be the subsequence
of the i￿th 3 rounds of each treatment. Within each time interval ￿i, subjects
experienced each and every possible k 2 f1;2;3g; with the order being randomly
determined within each ￿i: The reason for varying k in this manner is two fold.
First, di⁄erent k￿ s create di⁄erent motivations for contributing and, thus, might
a⁄ect agents￿expectations considerably. Moreover, we can keep under control
the time distance between two rounds characterized by the same value of k: As
mentioned, each subject was able to see the current values of k, together with
c, on the screen, before she made her contribution decision.
In some treatment conditions (see below), each round consists of 2 stages.
The ￿rst stage coincides with the game described in the previous paragraph.
The additional stage serves for the elicitation of subjects￿￿rst order beliefs.
Each subject have to answer the following question: "How many of the other
members of your group (excluding yourself) do you think have contributed in
this round?" To preserve simplicity of the experimental protocol, we restricted
the possible answers to integer numbers, such that the stated belief had to be
either 0, 1, or 2 if the subject believed that noone, 1 or 2 other member from
her group have contributed in the corresponding round.9
8The complete set of instructions, translated into English, is available upon request.
9Observe that what we actually observe, using this design, is the mode of the belief distri-
bution of subjects. Since the ￿rst-order belief is a distribution over opponents￿strategies, we
52.3 Factorial Design
We performed 4￿2 = 8 factorial design. As mentioned in the introduction, we
tested 4 degrees of belief elicitation and 2 frames with respect to the reference
point.
The 4 degrees of belief elicitation are the following:
￿ No elicitation. In 2 sessions, each round has a unique step, where subjects
have to decide whether to contribute or not. Beliefs are not elicited in
these sessions.
￿ Non-incentivized belief elicitation. In another 2 sessions, each experimen-
tal round consists of 2 stages. In the ￿rst stage, subjects have to decide
whether to contribute or not. In second, they have to state the number of
members of their group, which they believe will contribute in this round.
The belief elicitation stage have no monetary consequences.
￿ Incentivized belief elicitation. In 6 session of the experiment, each exper-
imental round is the same as in previous degree, with the di⁄erence that
the belief elicitation stage is now incentivized. Subject are paid 5 ptas.
anytime their guess is correct.10
￿ Belief play. In 2 sessions, each experimental round consists of 1 stage.
Contrary to other designs, subjects do not have to make the contribution
decision. Rather, they only state their beliefs about the play of other
members of their group and the computer decides for the them whether
to contribute or not, taking into account the stated belief, and assuming
that they are risk neutral and self-interested. Since, in this treatment,
the whole monetary consequences are determined by the belief, we allow
the stated belief to lie in the entire interval between 0 and 2, including
non-integer numbers. The possibility of non-integer beliefs is explained
to the experimental subjects as the possibility of doubt between possible
number of contributing opponents. For example, 1:5 is interpreted as a
belief that 1 member of the group cooperate with probability one half and
2 of them with the same probability.11
In each session, subjects played a total of 48 rounds. The 48 rounds were
divided into 2 phases, 24 rounds each. In each phase, subjects faced a frame
with a particular reference point; that is, each subject played both reference
points, each in one phase. A frame is uniquely de￿ned by a reference point.
Denote x0 the reference point agent faces in a particular round. Then, there
are 2 possible reference points in our experiment, x0 = c and x0 = 50. Let us
call the ￿rst (latter) case low (high) reference point12 and denote it T1(T2). The
elicit a proxy variable of this distribution.
10There are no monetary consequences for incorrect beliefs.
11We are aware that each number is not uniquely determined. For instance, 1.5 can also be
the result of believing that noone contributes with probablity 0.25 and 2 member with 0.75.
12As explained above, it is not always the case that this reference point is the low one. We,
nevertheless, use this terminology in order to simplify the discussion of results.
6￿rst case corresponds to the traditional Public Good Game frame. If an agent
contributes, she has to pay (loses) c, but if k or more individuals contribute she
can earn 50. Thus, the starting, reference point she faces is the cost, which she
can hold for herself if she does not contribute. In the case of x0 = 50, each
agent starts having the public good, and she decides whether to contribute. If
she does not contribute, she earns the contribution cost, but in case that less
than the required number of contributors contributes they all lose 50. Thus, the
staring point here is 50.
Let us call D1 (D2) be the design in which treatment T1 (T2) is played the
￿rst 24 rounds (see Table 8). To control for the possible order e⁄ects of the
framing, we conducted each treatment twice (6 times in cases of incentivized
belief elicitation), switching the order of framing.
D1 D2
Rounds S1 ￿ S6 S7 ￿ S12
1-24 Tc Tg
25-48 Tg Tc
Table 1. Experimental Sessions
In each session, the 24 subjects were divided into 2 cohorts of 12, with sub-
jects from di⁄erent cohorts never interacting with each other throughout the
session. We shall therefore read our experimental data under the assumption
that the history of each individual cohort corresponds to an independent obser-
vation of our experimental environment. Thus, we have 12￿2 = 24 independent
observations. Within each round t = 1;:::;48; in each cohort, 4 groups of 3
subjects were randomly determined, to preserve anonymity.
After each round each agent was informed of the contribution decision of the
other group members (i.e. the outcome for that round), together with her payo⁄
(on both dimensions: belief and contribution game) and the average payo⁄ of
her group members (only as for the contribution decision was concerned). The
same information was also given in the form of a History table, so that subjects
could easily review the results of all the rounds that had been played so far.
2.4 Payo⁄s
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects received 1:000 pesetas (1 euro is
approximately 166 pesetas) as an initial endowment.13 As for T1; subjects would
gain 50 pesetas if the number of contributors in their group would reach the
13It is standard practice, for all experiments run in Alicante, to use Spanish ptas. as
experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer
problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On the other hand,
although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use (substituted by the Euro in the year 2001),
Spanish people still use Pesetas to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this
respect, by using a ￿real￿ (as a opposed to an arti￿cial) currency, we avoid the problem of
framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g. ￿Experimental Currency￿)
with no cognitive content.
7target k (with c being subtracted from their initial endowment); in T2 subjects
would loose 50 from their initial endowment if the numbers of contributors would
not reach target, gaining c in case of non contribution. Subjects received, on
average, 16 euros for a 90￿session.
At the end of the sessions, subjects were asked to answer a detailed question-
naire on their socio-demographic characteristics, together with standard ques-
tions to estimate their pro-social behavior.
3 Experimental Results
In this section, we report the results of our experiment. We begin by presenting
some descriptive statistics, which summarize the e⁄ect of the factorial design in
our experiment and other observed regularities. We then estimate 2 econometric
models that allow us to study 2 research questions. First, we try to understand
how individuals form their decision in new situations on their personal charac-
teristics. In the second model, we depict the belief up-dating process of subject
throughout the experiment.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We shall divide this section according to the currently discussed e⁄ect.14
3.1.1 The E⁄ect of Belief Elicitation Method




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No elicitation Elicit non-incentivized
Elicit incentivized Belief play
Figure 1. Contribution behavior.
14Most of the results presented in this section is presented for time intervals, rather than
experimental rounds. With this structure, we like to get rid of the e⁄ect of k. The e⁄ect of k
is studied in more detail in the second part of Section 3.
8Figure 1 disaggregates the average contribution behavior by the belief-elicitation
method. On x-axis, we plot time intervals; the y-axis reports the percentages
of contributing individuals. The frequency of contribution decreases over time
in all but the belief play treatment, where it seems not to evolve over time. In
all cases, we observe an end-game e⁄ect. The salient features of each treatment
are:
￿ No elicitation. The frequency of contribution is the lowest in comparison
with other treatments, with this more pronounced in the last repetitions
of the game.
￿ Non-incentivized belief elicitation. The initial belief is much higher than
in any other treatment. Then, we observe a sharp decrease in the ￿rst
repetition of the game and a roughly constant frequency from ￿i = 4 on.
￿ Incentivized belief elicitation. Very smooth decreasing trend of contribu-
tion behavior.
￿ Belief play. Recall that, in this experimental design, people do not decide
their contribution behavior on their own. Rather, the computer decides
for them, given their stated belief. As a result, we observe no general
decreasing trend and high volatility, the former causing that the average
frequency is the highest in this treatment in the second half of the exper-
iment. The end-game e⁄ect is very strong, but it may also be due to the
high volatility in the contribution behavior of this treatment.
The pairwise comparison of the contribution behavior uncovers that there
is no real di⁄erence between the incentivized and non-incentivized belief elici-
tation, even though the ￿nancial incentives seem to lead to a larger end-game
e⁄ect, i.e. the contributions are lower in this treatment in the last repetitions
of the game. On the other hand, both treatments, together with the belief
play, lead to a slightly higher contribution levels, compared to the no elicitation
treatment. The belief play contributions are very similar to both belief eliciting
treatments.
On average, 37%, 39.5%, 40.5% and 41.7% of individuals contribute in no
elicitation, incentivized belief, non-incentivized belief, and belief play treat-
ments, respectively. This leads to the following conjecture:
Result 1 Belief elicitation does a⁄ects the play in our experiment, driving the
contributions upwards, closer to the level of stated beliefs. Contribution
behavior does not di⁄er much across treatment, as long as beliefs are
elicited.
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incentivized beliefs non-incentivized beliefs belief play
Figure 2. Beliefs.
Figure 2 traces the average beliefs, the x-axis again plotting the time inter-
vals. In all treatments, we observe a decreasing trend of beliefs over time. The
initial beliefs of non-incentivized belief elicitation are above the other 2 cases.
Hence, when beliefs are not incentivized, subjects initially expect higher contri-
butions. Average beliefs decreases constantly and smoothly in the incentivized
belief treatment. In contrast, the non-incentivizing leads to a sharp decreases
in the ￿rst repetitions, which compensate for the high beliefs in initial rounds,
but from ￿i = 3 on, they stay constant. The belief play produces very volatile
beliefs with a lower decreasing trend with respect to the other treatments. In
the last repetitions, there seems to be a radical decrease of beliefs in this treat-
ment. Nevertheless, we cannot say whether this is due to the end-game e⁄ect
or the mentioned volatility.
Result 2. Incentivizing of ￿rst-observed beliefs decreases their level (toward
the actual level of contributions).
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Figure 3. Beliefs and contributions.
10Figure 3 illustrates the capacity of experimental subjects to predict the be-
havior of opponents and its evolution over time. The lower graph traces the
average number of contributing opponents of each subject; the upper grey graph
traces the average beliefs. The left panel represents this ￿gure for incentivized
beliefs; the intermediate corresponds to the non-incentivized elicited beliefs; the
right panel reports the averages for the belief play.
The most salient observation from Figure 3 is that stated beliefs and con-
tributions are parallel, i.e. the evolution of both variables is on average very
similar. What di⁄ers is the level. In all cases, the average level of belief is larger.
In other words, people considerably overestimate the number of contributing in-
dividuals. Moreover, the di⁄erence between beliefs and contributions seems to
stay roughly constant over time.
The observed beliefs are correct in 36.7%, 38.5% and 27.3% of cases in
non-incentivized beliefs, incentivized beliefs, and belief play treatments, respec-
tively.To illustrate the di⁄erences across treatments, Figure 4, which plot the
average number of correct predictions on the y-axes, disaggregated by belief
elicitation method, summarizes the evolution of averages of correct beliefs. The
graph only con￿rms some of the above observations. Subjects, indeed, do not
learn enough to predict the opponents￿behavior better in the incentivized belief
treatment. However, in the remaining 2 cases, the average frequency of correct
beliefs actually decreases over time, being this decline much more pronounced
for the belief play.
Pairwisely, incentivizing of correct beliefs slightly rises the accuracy of beliefs
in comparison with when they are not incentivized. This is, on average, more
salient, as subjects get experienced. The belief play lead to a clear lower capacity
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Figure 4. Percentages of correct predictions.
Result 3. Some belief-learning process takes place (beliefs decreases over time
intervals), but the learning is not large enough to lead to better predic-
tions of opponents behavior. Incentivizing beliefs￿accuracy lead to slightly
better predictions.
113.1.2 The E⁄ect of Framing
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of the reference point on beliefs. Recall
that we run two frames concerning the reference point, T1, which represents the
standard Public Good Game, and T2, where the public good initially exists and
a su¢ cient number of individuals has to contribute to maintain it (i.e. if they
do not contribute they have a loss).
Figure 5 illustrates graphically the impact the reference point has on average
level of beliefs. Again, x-axis traces the time intervals. Figure 5(a) plots the
average stated belief, while Figures 5(b-d) disaggregates the data by the belief
elicitation mechanism. In each subgraph of Figure 5, the upper plot represents
the high reference point treatment T2, whereas the lower line stands for T1. Two
main conclusions can be driven from Figure 5.
First, there is almost no di⁄erence in initial ￿rst-order beliefs. Hence, the
framing seems to have no e⁄ect in the ￿rst rounds of the game. This contrast
with the ￿ndings of Dufwenberg et al. [6] who observe that, in the one-shot
Public Good Game, the ￿rst-order beliefs are signi￿cantly higher in the treat-
ment, corresponding to our T1. A closer look at Figure 5 leads to an even starker
contrast of our ￿ndings with theirs. In the ￿gure, there actually are tiny di⁄er-
ences in the ￿rst round beliefs. Nevertheless, the graph of the overall data, as
well as 2 out 3 treatments, reverses the rank observed by Dufwenberg et al. We
observe that, on average, the initial ￿rst-order beliefs are higher in the higher
reference point frame, T2.
The second regularity we observe is the contrast in the evolution across the
2 framings. Since the very beginning, stated beliefs are lower in T1, in harmony
with the contribution levels, which have the same order (see Iturbe-Ormaetxe
et al.[10] for more evidence on framing e⁄ects in the same experimental proto-
col). Moreover, the later the experimental round, the more pronounced is the
di⁄erence between the two treatments. People learn both to contribute less in
the standard Public Good Game treatment and to expect less contribution from
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T1 T2
Figure 5. The framing e⁄ect on beliefs
Result 4. Framing does not seems to matter initially, but as subjects gain
experience, they expect lower contribution levels in the standard Public
Good Game framing.
3.2 Anchoring e⁄ect
As we already explained in Section 2, the cost of contributing, c, is randomly
generated in each round and independent across players. Therefore, knowing
own cost in a particular round provides no information whatsoever about the
possible play of other members of the group. Actually, the observed correlation
coe¢ cient between the cost of contribution of an individual and the play of her
opponents in the same round is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 (￿ = 0:01,
p = 0:44). Consequently, experimental subjects should not take their own cost
into account when evaluating their prediction of play of others. However, we
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Figure 6. The relation of beliefs on cost of contribution
Figure 6 traces the dependence of average beliefs, y-axis, on the individual
costs of contribution, x-axis.15 We observe a negative relation in most of the
graphs of Figure 6.
Figure 6(a) stresses the di⁄erent relation between the two variables across
treatments with respect to the reference point. In both cases, there is a negative
relation between beliefs and c. The average beliefs are considerably more af-
fected by the cost in the standard Public Good Game framing, T1. The negative
dependence is less pronounced in T2, but still evident.
The contrast among the belief elicitation degree, illustrated by Figure 6(b),
shows that the negative relation between is present in all cases. There is almost
no observable di⁄erence between the non-incentivized and incentivized belief
elicitation, as long as c is large enough. For low c, non-incentivized beliefs are
more sensitive on cost than incentivized beliefs. The belief play lead to the
least negative relation between beliefs and c. In this case, beliefs are below
the average values of the remaining two treatment conditions, whereas for large
values, the lower sensitivity causes that the average beliefs turn out to lie above
the averages of the other two treatments.
Generally, we can state two following results:
Result 5. The degree of anchoring beliefs on irrelevant information is more
in￿ uenced by the change in the reference point, rather than in the belief-
elicitation method. In the latter case, it seems that the higher payo⁄
consequences of beliefs, the lower is the degree of sensitivity of beliefs on
the contribution cost.
To analyze whether people learn not to use their c in their beliefs, Figure
6(c) contrasts the average ￿rst-order beliefs in the ￿rst and last tine interval.
The black line corresponds to the ￿rst interval relation; the grey line represents
the last interval. We observe a decreasing trend in both cases. In spite of some
di⁄erences, the lower graphs looks as parallel to the upper line. Thus, there
seems to be no real di⁄erence in the relation between the 2 variables.16 Thus,
subject does not learn not to use the irrelevant information contained in their
own costs, even though there is a zero correlation.
15For illustration purposes, we divided all the relevant interval of c into 11 disjoint subin-
tervals.
16The shift, clearly, is due to the general lower level of beliefs, as time proceeds.
143.3 Formation and Evolution of beliefs
In the introduction, we argue that beliefs are very relevant for game-theoretical
analysis, and, in the previous subsection, we show that beliefs, as well as choices,
are in￿ uenced by the way they are elicited, by framing etc. Consequently, in this
section, we attempt to - at least partially - endogenize ￿rst-order beliefs, and
provide an empirical model of belief up-dating process. Recall the treatment
designs with respect to the belief elicitation are no-elicitation, elicited non-
incentivized beliefs, elicited incentivized, and belief play. In the ￿rst case, beliefs
are not elicited, and, in the belief play treatment, beliefs are allowed to be non-
integer. Therefore, only elicited incentivized and non-incentivized beliefs can be
analyzed using the same econometric model. Consequently, in this subsection,
we only consider a 2￿2 factorial design, using treatment, which provides beliefs
as an ordered discrete variable. This leads to 4 treatment conditions, which we
treat separately in the estimations. To this aim, we de￿ne 4 dummy variables
f
j
it with j = 1;2;3;4, such that j = 1 if subject i in round t participates in
the non-incentivized beliefs treatment with T1; j = 2 for the non-incentivized
beliefs treatment and T2; j = 3 for the incentivized beliefs treatment with T1;
j = 4 for incentivized beliefs with T2.17 The dummy variable f
j
it = 1 if agent i
in round t participates in treatment condition j.
3.3.1 Belief formation
The main objective of this section is to check whether the unobservability of
beliefs, as the main argument against their wider applicability, could be side-
tracked by the employment of alternatives. In our case, the questionnaire data
extract from our subjects their socio-demographic characteristics and pro-social
attitudes, which we relate to the ￿rst-round stated beliefs, as a proxy for the
initial pre-play beliefs of subjects, that are still not in￿ uenced by the play. The
goal is to provide a simple, empirically-relevant model which may facilitate the
applicability of theories containing beliefs in one-shot situations.
To this aim, we run an ordered logit regression of individuals￿beliefs in the
￿rst rounds of our experimental sessions. There are two types of explanatory
variables. First, we control for the possible e⁄ect of the experimental design on
the initial beliefs, and, second, we regress beliefs over the questionnaire data.
The model also contains interactions of both types of variables. In the following,
we list the variables, which we have found to have a signi￿cant impact on the
dependent variable:18
￿ treatment dummies fj with j = 1;2;3;4;
￿ the contribution costs, c, in the initial period;
￿ gender dummy, sex;
17Clearly, f
j
it serves for the panel data analysis in Section 3.4. In the following Section 3.3.1,
we only deal with data in round 1. The time subsrcipt is, thus, omitted and, for treatment
dummies, we use f
j
i with j = 1;2;3;4.
18The variable k was ￿xed for all sessions in the ￿rst round and equal to 3.
15￿ the size of the family subjects live in, familysize;
￿ active is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bread-winner in
i ￿ s family is unemployed and does not actively search a new job;
￿ lastweekwork is a dummy such that lastweekworki = 0 if i had not
worked the week before the experiment, and 1 if she had;
￿ lotteryi 2 f0;1;:::;7g measures the frequency, with which i engages in
lotteries or bets, being lottery1 higher, the higher the frequency;
￿ riskaversioni = 1 if subject i prefers 30, rather than playing a lot-
tery where she earns 45 with probability 80% or 0 with 20% probability,
and riskaversioni = 0 if she accepts the lottery, i.e. i is risk averse if
riskaversioni = 1;
￿ pers2extremei = 1(0) if i (does not) ￿nd herself either extremely quick or
extremely slow in reasoning;
￿ cognitive 2 f1;2;:::;7g, measuring individual￿ s subjective opinion about
his cognitive skills, being cognitivei increasing the more skilled ￿nds i
herself;
￿ pers3extremei = 1(0) if i (does not) ￿nd herself either very easy or very
hard to get o⁄ended;
￿ satisfactioni = 0 if i evaluates herself either very satis￿ed or very unsat-
is￿ed with her life, and satisfactioni = 1 in the other case;
￿ extremepoliticsi = 1 for subjects who ￿nd politic issues extremely impor-
tant and extremely unimportant and 0 for less extreme opinions about the
importance of politics;
￿ religionlowi = 1 in case of subjects who ￿nd religion unimportant and 0
otherwise;
￿ inequality 2 f0;1g elicits subjects￿inclination toward the deservings of
higher earnings, when one works more, being inequalityi = 0 for individ-
uals who prefer equality of earnings, independently of work performance,
and 1 for those who ￿nd the performance more relevant in ￿nancial eval-
uation;19
￿ state1inter 2 f0;1g is related to inequality, such that state1inter = 1
if i has a moderate opinion in this respect, i.e. she neither believes that
only inequality matters nor that only the individual e⁄ort does, and it is
0 for those who tend to stress either the role of equality or the role of
e⁄ort-related incentives;
19The variable is an answer to the following question: "Consider the following situation:
Two secretaries with the same age do exactly the same work. However, one of them earns
20e per week more than the other. The one that is paid more is more e¢ cient and faster,
while working. Do you believe it is fair that one earns more than the other?." The variable
inequalityi = 0 if the answer is "No" and 1 otherwise.
16￿ statement2 2 f1;2;:::;7g measures subjects￿opinion on a scale between
two extreme statements: "Firms should be private" and "Firms should be
state-owned". The closer is i￿ s opinion to the ￿rst statement, the lower is
statement2;
￿ statement5 2 f1;2;:::;7g reports the position of i￿ s opinion between two
extreme statements, "The competition is positive. It stimulates people to
work harder and develop new ideas" and "The competition is negative. It
reveals the bad side of humans";
￿ statement7 2 f1;2;:::;7g again measures the position between two state-
ments: "Independently of the qualities and de￿ciencies of parents, they
should always be loved and respected" and "Parents who have not earned
the love by their attitudes and behavior should not be loved"; the closer
the opinion to the ￿rst statement the lower statement7.
Table 2 reports the estimation results ( together with the standard errors,
p-values, signi￿cancy statistics and odds ratios).
Put Table 2 around here.
Given the aim of this section, we mainly focus on the overall characteristics
of the model. In this respect, we run a model speci￿cation test, we test the
general joint signi￿cation of the variables of the model, and discuss brie￿ y its
￿t.
To test whether our model is correctly speci￿ed, we run a model speci￿cation
test. We cannot reject the correct speci￿cation of the model (p = 0:2). This
is also con￿rmed by the Likelihood Ratio test. The variables of the model are
jointly signi￿cant on any reasonable signi￿cance level (LR = 169:893;p = 0). To
check the measure of ￿t of our model, McFadden￿ s R2 is 0.478 and McKelvey and
Zavoina￿ s R2 reaches even 0.959.20 Since we do not reject any of the performed
tests and the ￿t of the model is high, we conclude that it is possible to at least
approximate unobserved beliefs, using variables that one observes in the relevant
sample.
It is also worth to discuss the e⁄ects of design variables on the initial beliefs.
In this respect, let us start with the e⁄ect of treatment dummies in the model.
The average levels of beliefs in the ￿rst round of the experiment are 1.21, 1.54,
0.99 and 1.26 for f1, f2,f3and f4, respectively. There seem to be some di⁄er-
ences. Beliefs seems to be lower when the reference point is as in the standard
Public Good Game, and, within both the low and high reference point framings,
beliefs are higher in the non-incentivized belief elicitation treatment, as already
observed in Section 3.1.
The most straightforward test is to contrast pairwisely whether the e⁄ect
of treatment dummies does not di⁄er across the 4 treatments. Therefore, we
20We also run an alternative model, where only signi￿cant variables are included. In this
model, the model speci￿cation test￿ s p-values reaches 0.98, McFadden￿ s R2 is 0.3664 and
McKelvey and Zavoina￿ s R2 is 0.88.
17test the joint hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cients associated to treatment
dummies f2,f3and f4 are all simultaneously equal to 0, to test the di⁄erences
between non-incentivized beliefs and low reference and the remaining 3 treat-
ments.21 To test the di⁄erences between treatments 2,3 and 4, we run other 3
joint tests with the null hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cients, associated to
the same variables, do not di⁄er across the 3 treatments.22 From the estimation
results, we can see that this is not the case and the tests, indeed, con￿rm this
(p = 0 in all cases). Thus, since, in each treatment, di⁄erent variables in￿ uence
the initial beliefs, we conclude that the distribution of initial beliefs in the ￿rst
rounds of the experiment are generated by di⁄erent processes. At this point,
it is worth stressing that the performed tests only lead to the conclusion that
the process of belief generation is di⁄erent, in￿ uenced by diverse factors that
depend on treatment conditions.
These results notwithstanding, the average level of beliefs can still be very
similar across treatments. This is actually suggested by the average values
of beliefs. For example, the average beliefs in f1 and f4 are 1.21 and 1.26,
respectively. These values are that close that it is hard to belief we would reject
their equality in a statistical test, performed on level of beliefs, rather than the
roles of individual variables in the model.
Traditionally, this is tested using marginal e⁄ects of relevant variables. Mar-
ginal e⁄ects are calculated on basis of the movement of the concerned variable,
holding all other variables constant. This is an unrealistic approach in our data,
since a change of a treatment dummy, necessarily, entails a change in another
one. Hence, rather than studying marginal e⁄ects, we use the estimated prob-
abilities of the dependent variables across the 4 treatment conditions tested in
our model, and calculate the average beliefs. Their pairwise comparisons permit
us to test whether, in spite of the di⁄erent processes that generate them, the
average estimated levels of beliefs are the same.
The main points, resulting from the tests, are:
1. non-incentivized belief elicitation and high reference point generates the
highest pre-play beliefs (p = 0:09;0;0:11 for f1;f3;f4, respectively), even
though the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant on traditional 5% signi￿cance level
in two cases, and
2. incentivized elicitation in low reference points treatment leads to signi￿-
cantly lower initial level of beliefs than f2, as mentioned above, and f4
(p = 0), but not f1 (p = 0:24).
21Formally, the 3 hypotheses are that all the estimated coe¢ cients b ￿fj, b ￿fj￿c, b ￿fj￿sex,
b ￿fj￿famsize, b ￿fj￿lottery, b ￿fj￿riskaversion, b ￿fj￿pers2, b ￿fj￿inequality, b ￿fj￿statement2,
b ￿fj￿statement5 and b ￿fj￿statement7 for j = 2;3;4 are all equal to 0.
22Formally, the joint hypothesis of this 3 pairwise tests is that, simultaneously, b ￿fj = b ￿fk,
b ￿fj￿c = b ￿fk￿c, b ￿fj￿sex = b ￿fk￿sex, b ￿fj￿famsize = b ￿fk￿famsize, b ￿fj￿lottery = b ￿fk￿lottery,
b ￿fj￿riskaversion = b ￿fk￿riskaversion, b ￿fj￿pers2 = b ￿fk￿pers2, b ￿fj￿inequality = b ￿fk￿inequality,
b ￿fj￿statement2 = b ￿fk￿statement2, b ￿fj￿statement5 = b ￿fk￿statement5 and b ￿fj￿statement7 =
b ￿fk￿statement7 for j = 2;3;4, k = 3;4 and k > j.
18The relation between f1 and f4 from the above example is, indeed, non-
signi￿cant (p = 0:33).
The next step is the role of contribution cost in the belief formation. From
Table 2, we see that c is signi￿cant for f1 and the same holds for f3 and f4
(p-values of b ￿c + b ￿f3￿c and b ￿c + b ￿f4￿c are 0 and 0.03, respectively), while the
e⁄ect is not signi￿cant for f2 (p = 0:26). The interesting pattern is that the
e⁄ect of c is negative for f1 and f3, i.e. for the treatment with the low reference
point, and positive otherwise. To interpret this, we test whether the e⁄ect is
jointly signi￿cant for low and high reference point treatments. We cannot accept
the signi￿cance in the latter case (p = 0:6), whereas we accept it in the former
(p = 0). We conclude that there is the anchoring e⁄ect in the standard Public
Good Game framing and c negatively e⁄ect subjects￿beliefs, whereas in the
high reference point treatment, people do not take their own cost into account
that much.
Finally, we discuss the role of questionnaire data in the belief formation
process. At this level, we only brie￿ y summarize the e⁄ect of individual variables
in the model:
￿ In most cases, men expect higher contributions.
￿ We observe a negative e⁄ect of the size of family on stated beliefs.
￿ Subjects, in whose families the bread-winner is economically inactive tend
to state higher beliefs.
￿ Risk aversion, mainly, has a positive e⁄ect on stated beliefs.
￿ There is a big di⁄erence in stated beliefs between individuals with extreme
opinions and attitudes, and subjects, whose opinions and attitudes are
moderate. The e⁄ect di⁄ers across variables.
3.4 Belief evolution
In this subsection, we exploit the panel structure of our data to analyze the
belief-updating process of experimental subjects. To this aim, we run an ordered
logit regression of individual beliefs in each round on variables that might play
a role in the belief-updating process, and individual characteristics, controlling
for possible dependencies of data within cohorts.23
We classify the variables of the model into 3 groups. The ￿rst group is
formed of variables related to the experimental design:
￿ the number of individuals required for the public good to be provided, k.
In order not to impose a linear relation between beliefs and k; we introduce
k in the model in form of dummies k
j
it with j = 1;2;3;
23Recall that we observe the individual heteregeneity of our subject in the questionnaire
data. Hence, we do not have to control for individual e⁄ects in the estimation. This simpli￿es
dramatically the statistical analysis of this section.
19￿ the cost of contribution, cit;
￿ the treatment e⁄ects, which are, in analogy with the previous section,
represented by four dummies f
j
it with j = 1;2;3;4;
￿ period, to control for a possible trend in the data, which is not explained
by the variables of model;
￿ sequence, to control for a possible di⁄erences between the ￿rst and second
phases of each session.
The second group contains variables from previous rounds. We further divide
these variables into 2 subgroups. The ￿rst subgroup consists of variables from
previous rounds, independently of the conditions of the corresponding round; in
the second subgroup, we include variables from previous rounds with the same
k. To clarify the discussion of the estimation results, we below call the ￿rst
type lagged variables, while referring to the the second type, we will use the
term k-lagged variables. This classi￿cation is motivated by Iturbe-Ormaetxe et
al. (2007) who ￿nds enormous di⁄erences in both contributions and beliefs, as
k changes. Our ￿ndings also show that this distinction matters.
In the model, we include lags and k-lags of the following variables:
￿ beliefit 2 f0;1;2g is the stated belief.
￿ contributeit = 0 if i does not contribute in period t, and 1 otherwise.
￿ hereffortit 2 f0;1;2g is the number of other members of i￿ s group con-
tributing.
￿ outcomeit = 0 if the public good is not provided, and 1 otherwise.
￿ correctbeliefit = 0 if the stated belief is not correct, and 1 otherwise.
The last group includes the variables used and described in the previous
section. We do not discuss their individual estimates in the text.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. The benchmark case is f1 = 1
and k1 = 1.
Put Table 3 around here.
To check the validity of the model, we ￿rst test for the speci￿cation of the
model. The test statistics is far from the critical value and we can conclude
that our model is correctly speci￿ed (p = 0:36). The Log-Likelihood test leads
to the same results. Jointly, the variables of the model are signi￿cant on any
reasonable level (p = 0). As measures of the ￿t of the model, the McFadden￿ s
R2 is 0.19 and McKelvey and Zavoina￿ s R2 reaches 0.38.
We start the discussion with discussing the e⁄ects of treatments. We cannot
separate e⁄ects that are due to change in two treatment conditions. Thus, while
discussing the e⁄ect of reference point and belief incentivizing (treatment dum-
mies) and k￿ s, we focus on comparisons, holding either the treatment dummy
20or k ￿xed. In this respect, Table 4 lists the p-values of all concerned pairwise
comparisons of average beliefs. In each cell, the null hypothesis is that beliefs
are, on average, the same under both design features.
Put Table 4 around here.
Within the same treatment conditions, k has no e⁄ect for non-incentivized
beliefs and low reference point. For the remaining treatments, there always
are signi￿cantly di⁄erent beliefs between k = 1 and k = 2, the latter inducing
higher stated beliefs in all cases. Moreover, there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence
between k = 1 and k = 3 when beliefs are incentivized and the reference point
is high. People expect more contribution for k = 3. This is also true in cases of
other treatments, even though the e⁄ects are not signi￿cant. In the remaining
cases, the e⁄ect of k is not signi￿cant.
If we, on the other hand, hold constant k and study between-treatment
di⁄erences, we can observe, under which condition either the reference point or
belief incentivizing have a signi￿cant impact on beliefs.
For all values of k; all but two pairwise comparisons lead to the rejection of
the equality of average beliefs. The e⁄ects are in harmony with the ￿ndings of
Section 3.1. On general, both high reference point and non-incentivized beliefs
induce higher stated beliefs.
Table 3 also con￿rms the conjecture from Section 3.1 that beliefs depend on
c. The e⁄ect is statistical signi￿cant in all treatments (p = 0 for f1, f2 and
f3 and p = 0:02 for f4). The sensitive of beliefs on c is the largest in non-
incentivized belief treatment with low reference point. The sensitivity is lower
in the remaining cases and is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent across them. Since, at
this level, we work with the entire data set, we con￿rm that people do not learn
not to use c for the evaluation of the number of contributing opponents.
The last two variables concerning the experimental design, are period and
sequence. Since the ￿rst variable, period, is not signi￿cant, we conclude that
the evolution of individual beliefs is captured by other variables of the model.24
Neither the latter variable is signi￿cant, but we observe the expected sign. For
people somehow learn to expect less contribution over time, we expect them to
use to some extent their past experience in the second phase of the experiment.
This is con￿rmed by the negative sign of this variable.
The main ￿ndings of the model are expressed by the lagged and k-lagged
variables. From Table 3, we observe that subjects indeed use past information
to form beliefs. In the following, we analyze which variables and to what extent.
One of the ￿rst observations is that the impact of k-lagged variables clearly
exceeds the e⁄ect of lagged ones. Therefore, subject use the past play, but
they select the experiences that are similar to the actual conditions. This is
well illustrated by p-values of the lagged variables. In most cases, they are not
signi￿cant in the model, whereas the most recent k-lags of our variables are
signi￿cant.
24Obviously, in this model, we impose a linear relation between beliefs and experimental
periods. We also ran regressions using di⁄erent functional forms and the estimation results
have not change.
21The only lagged variable that has an impact is hereffort. The p-values
suggest that the behavior of opponents in last 3 periods somehow matters, even
though only the ￿rst lag is signi￿cant on traditional 5% (the p-values are 0,
0.08 and 0.19 for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd lag, respectively). All the 3 lags are
positive, suggesting that, not surprisingly, the more the other members of the
group contributed in the past, the more likely is an individual to state a higher
belief.
In contrast, people do not seem to consider their last belief, whether their
last belief was correct, whether the public good was actually provided, what
they believed in last round, or whether they contributed. The main driving
force among the lagged variables for them was the behavior of others.
Among the k-lagged variables, the most important are k-lagged beliefs. All 6
lags of this variable are signi￿cant on 5%.25 The p-values are 0 in the more recent
k-lages and they start to increase with more distant lags. Hence, people use their
last beliefs a lot to form their actual beliefs. All the estimated coe¢ cients are
positive and all the odd ratios are larger than 1. Thus, the higher any of the
past k-lags the higher is the actual belief.
It might be surprising that even such a distant k-lags matter in the actual
beliefs. It suggests that the belief up-dating is very rigid and people only slowly
adjust their beliefs to the actual play. This is con￿rmed by the accuracy of
beliefs, discussed in Section 3.1, and by the fact that whether subjects￿beliefs
where correct in last round or not has almost no e⁄ect on the belief up-dating.
Moreover, concerning past beliefs people carefully select which past expectations
they use to up-date current ones.
Again, the behavior of others is very important for the belief adjustment
process. The last two k-lags are signi￿cant in the model, suggesting that while
predicting the behavior of others, contrary to the role of past beliefs, people
combine the most recent experience with the experience from situations similar
to the actual ones.
In contrast to lagged variables, past contribution behavior, whether the pub-
lic good was actually provided, and whether the past belief was correct have
signi￿cant impact on beliefs in case of k-lagged variables.
Concerning, past contribution behavior, people should not take into account
their own past behavior in their expectations about others￿behavior, unless they
do not expect others to be in￿ uenced by them. Then, the estimated coe¢ cient
would be expected to be positive. However, we observe the reverse sign. If
people contributed in last period with the same k, they are less likely to expect
others to contribute. If the public good was provided in last round with the
same k, people tend to expect more contribution, and a correct guess in the
previous round with the same k induces people to expect less contribution in
the current round.
The last important result of the estimations is the role of socio-demographics
and pro-social attitudes in the evolution process of beliefs. In the model, we
25We also replicated the regression including the 7th k-lag, this being still signi￿cant. Nev-
ertheless, recall that each k appears only 8 times in each experiment. Then, including the 7th
k-lag reduces drastically the number of observations.
22use the same set of variables as in Section 3.3.1. Even though these variables
explains a great part of the variability of initial beliefs, they have almost no
e⁄ect in the current model. Therefore, we conclude that the belief up-dating
process is not in￿ uenced much by these variables. Rather, the history of the
play and experimental design are the main driving forces for the evolution of
beliefs throughout the experiment.
4 Conclusions
This research project encompasses a large empirical analysis of ￿rst-order be-
liefs. The results suggest that how beliefs are elicited matters for both the play
and beliefs in various instances. Moreover, we show that beliefs of individuals
could be predicted and approximated, using their attributes that, in many sit-
uation, might be more likely to be observable in real-life situations. Last, we
report that the up-dating of beliefs is a sophisticated (even though unconscious)
learning process, which depends on the whole range of variables. In this paper,
we uncover a set of factors that matter and show another aspects that do not.
The salient feature is the role of past beliefs as the most relevant factor in belief
learning, suggesting that the belief learning process is very rigid, in the sense
that people only slowly adjust their beliefs to the actual play. These consid-
eration notwithstanding, we also observe that a large part of the evolutionary
process of beliefs is due to the past play of opponents. In this respect, people
combine their most recent experience with more distant experience from similar
situations.
This paper is meant to be a partial step in a larger empirical modeling of
beliefs on basis of more easily observable variables, with the aim to provide
theoreticians with regularities that have to be embedded into the existing be-
lief learning theories. It is, for instance, clear that we have not exhausted the
whole range of possible explicative variables for better understanding of be-
lief formation and evolution. Our questionnaire focuses on socio-demographic
characteristics and pro-social attitudes. We, for example, do not elicit basic
variables such intelligence, con￿dence etc. Future research should concentrate
on searching the most robust variables that matter in the belief-related process,
independently of experimental design.
Another direction for future research is the analysis of di⁄erences among
experimental games. There is a stark contrast between cooperative-like games,
as for instance Public Good Game analyzed in this paper, and constant sum
games. Nyarko and Schotter [13] provides an evidence on the evolution of beliefs
in the second type of games, which uncovers that there is a completely di⁄erent
behavior process behind the evolution of beliefs in constant-sum games.
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25Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
f2 -59.91302 9.059141 -6.61 0 -77.66861 -42.15743
f3 -40.94495 6.572192 -6.23 0 -53.82621 -28.06369
f4 -37.38235 3.984298 -9.38 0 -45.19143 -29.57326
c -0.445857 0.0763141 -5.84 0 -0.5954298 -0.2962842
c * f2 0.48557 0.0755772 6.42 0 0.3374414 0.6336987
c * f3 0.3462816 0.0717817 4.82 0 0.205592 0.4869713
c * f4 0.5240089 0.0903491 5.8 0 0.3469278 0.7010899
active 33.21555 1.496275 22.2 0 30.2829 36.14819
lastweekwork 0.8877911 0.5755148 1.54 0.123 -0.2401971 2.015779
pers2extreme -1.9803 1.011384 -1.96 0.05 -3.962576 0.0019769
pers3extreme -0.825522 0.8485839 -0.97 0.331 -2.488716 0.837672
satisfaction 2.238174 0.7285328 3.07 0.002 0.8102754 3.666072
politicsextreme 2.142533 0.5198342 4.12 0 1.123677 3.16139
religionlow -1.531298 0.8931241 -1.71 0.086 -3.281789 0.2191931
state1inter 4.444828 1.24657 3.57 0 2.001595 6.888061
sex -5.994991 0.9233613 -6.49 0 -7.804746 -4.185236
f2 * sex -1.159996 2.029024 -0.57 0.568 -5.136809 2.816817
f3 * sex 7.91836 1.180031 6.71 0 5.605542 10.23118
f4 * sex 5.280754 1.687535 3.13 0.002 1.973245 8.588262
familysize -2.671971 0.5179312 -5.16 0 -3.687098 -1.656845
f2 * famsize 3.160437 1.026696 3.08 0.002 1.14815 5.172725
f3 * famsize 2.704613 0.4572202 5.92 0 1.808478 3.600748
f4 * famsize 1.779394 0.6749642 2.64 0.008 0.4564887 3.1023
lottery -13.31925 1.17044 -11.38 0 -15.61327 -11.02523
f2 * lottery 13.3195 1.297809 10.26 0 10.77584 15.86315
f3 * lottery 13.60503 1.251986 10.87 0 11.15118 16.05888
f4 * lottery 13.30004 1.164846 11.42 0 11.01698 15.58309
riskaversion 12.97805 0.8976255 14.46 0 11.21874 14.73737
f2 * riskaversion -16.90061 1.479918 -11.42 0 -19.8012 -14.00003
f3 * riskaversion -12.47134 1.218489 -10.24 0 -14.85954 -10.08315
f4 * riskaversion -10.79507 0.7486524 -14.42 0 -12.26241 -9.327742
cognitive 2.385189 0.5114382 4.66 0 1.382788 3.387589
f2 * cognitive 0.390737 0.8361821 0.47 0.64 -1.24815 2.029624
f3 * cognitive -1.853774 0.8553058 -2.17 0.03 -3.530142 -0.177405
f4 * cognitive -3.004177 0.6584604 -4.56 0 -4.294736 -1.713619
inequality 11.23619 1.082198 10.38 0 9.115117 13.35725
f2 * inequality -9.9704 1.550765 -6.43 0 -13.00984 -6.930957
f3 * inequality -9.289218 1.420684 -6.54 0 -12.07371 -6.504728
f4 * inequality -8.853907 1.503389 -5.89 0 -11.80049 -5.90732
statement2 2.516139 0.2840697 8.86 0 1.959372 3.072905
f2 * statement2 -0.4487177 0.2673244 -1.68 0.093 -0.9726639 0.0752284
f3 * statement2 -3.191947 0.336031 -9.5 0 -3.850555 -2.533338
f4 * statement2 -2.432466 0.5367134 -4.53 0 -3.484405 -1.380527
statement5 -1.355678 0.20319 -6.67 0 -1.753923 -0.9574332
f2 * statement5 1.365262 0.3829256 3.57 0 0.614742 2.115783f3 * statement5 1.493354 0.2540361 5.88 0 0.9954518 1.991255
f4 * statement5 0.6246558 0.2980358 2.1 0.036 0.0405164 1.208795
statement7 -4.448238 0.4869394 -9.14 0 -5.402622 -3.493854
f2 * statement7 6.950698 0.7279505 9.55 0 5.523941 8.377455
f3 * statement7 4.267034 0.4883618 8.74 0 3.309862 5.224205
f4 * statement7 5.340376 0.6182029 8.64 0 4.12872 6.552031
Cut-off values: cut1 = -40.625 (4.362), cut2 = -37.088 (3.984)
Note:  N = 166, chi2 = 1.01*10
10 (p = 0)
Fit: McFadden R2 = .480, Cox-Snell R2 = .638, McKelvey and Zavoina R2 = .964, Count R2 = .790. 
              Table 2. Belief Formation: Estimation Results.Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
f2 -1.775719 0.6748965 -2.63 0.009 -3.098492 -0.4529463
f3 -2.135791 0.7029311 -3.04 0.002 -3.513511 -0.7580717
f4 -2.317946 1.006071 -2.3 0.021 -4.289808 -0.3460829
k2 -0.684065 0.4335563 -1.58 0.115 -1.53382 0.1656897
k3 -0.9371951 0.2749261 -3.41 0.001 -1.47604 -0.3983498
f2 * k2 0.7707425 0.428828 1.8 0.072 -0.0697449 1.61123
f2 * k3 1.608416 0.417841 3.85 0 0.7894625 2.427369
f3 * k2 0.6370272 0.4571556 1.39 0.163 -0.2589812 1.533036
f3 * k3 0.7653789 0.2555386 3 0.003 0.2645324 1.266225
f4* k2 0.8326258 0.4640547 1.79 0.073 -0.0769047 1.742156
f4 * k3 0.8609656 0.369369 2.33 0.02 0.1370156 1.584916
c -0.0564082 0.012994 -4.34 0 -0.081876 -0.0309403
c * f2 0.0427845 0.0130093 3.29 0.001 0.0172867 0.0682822
c * f3 0.0367157 0.0138734 2.65 0.008 0.0095243 0.0639071
c * f4 0.0387602 0.0153805 2.52 0.012 0.008615 0.0689054
period 0.0251593 0.0328696 0.77 0.444 -0.039264 0.0895826
sequence -0.0422831 0.0788906 -0.54 0.592 -0.1969057 0.1123396
lag1_belief 0.0571451 0.0762198 0.75 0.453 -0.092243 0.2065332
lag2_belief -0.0049455 0.0546984 -0.09 0.928 -0.1121524 0.1022613
lag3_belief 0.0883978 0.0630702 1.4 0.161 -0.0352174 0.2120131
lag4_belief -0.051984 0.0985226 -0.53 0.598 -0.2450848 0.1411168
lag5_belief -0.0109537 0.0859644 -0.13 0.899 -0.1794408 0.1575334
lag1_contribute -0.0683999 0.1342422 -0.51 0.61 -0.3315097 0.1947099
lag2_contribute -0.1545462 0.1171965 -1.32 0.187 -0.3842472 0.0751547
lag3_contribute 0.0478741 0.111108 0.43 0.667 -0.1698936 0.2656417
lag4_contribute 0.4159303 0.168591 2.47 0.014 0.0854981 0.7463625
lag5_contribute -0.1173542 0.1164533 -1.01 0.314 -0.3455984 0.1108899
lag1_hereffort 0.1835875 0.0627694 2.92 0.003 0.0605617 0.3066132
lag2_hereffort 0.1729682 0.0972053 1.78 0.075 -0.0175506 0.363487
lag3_hereffort 0.1044636 0.0797159 1.31 0.19 -0.0517766 0.2607038
lag4_hereffort -0.1414988 0.1170361 -1.21 0.227 -0.3708853 0.0878877
lag5_hereffort -0.0178563 0.0963694 -0.19 0.853 -0.2067369 0.1710243
lag1_outcome 0.0734701 0.1486944 0.49 0.621 -0.2179656 0.3649058
lag2_outcome -0.00662 0.1434709 -0.05 0.963 -0.2878178 0.2745779
lag1_correctbelief -0.1394478 0.1121919 -1.24 0.214 -0.3593398 0.0804443
lag2_correctbelief -0.0013101 0.1101352 -0.01 0.991 -0.2171711 0.2145509
lag1_k_belief 0.4894381 0.1275971 3.84 0 0.2393524 0.7395239
lag2_k_belief 0.6177474 0.12505 4.94 0 0.3726538 0.862841
lag3_k_belief 0.3992394 0.0745929 5.35 0 0.25304 0.5454388
lag4_k_belief 0.283327 0.0697977 4.06 0 0.146526 0.420128
lag_5_kbelief 0.181998 0.0678948 2.68 0.007 0.0489266 0.3150695
lag_6_kbelief 0.1647524 0.0752052 2.19 0.028 0.017353 0.3121518
lag_1_kcontribute -0.280881 0.1544945 -1.82 0.069 -0.5836845 0.0219226
lag2_k_contribute 0.1939147 0.1630044 1.19 0.234 -0.125568 0.5133974
lag1_k_hereffort 0.266405 0.0991953 2.69 0.007 0.0719858 0.4608243
lag2_k_hereffort 0.3723271 0.1122176 3.32 0.001 0.1523847 0.5922695
lag3_k_hereffort 0.0594582 0.1027478 0.58 0.563 -0.1419238 0.2608402
lag4_k_hereffort 0.1325824 0.0908172 1.46 0.144 -0.0454161 0.3105809
lag5_k_hereffort -0.051273 0.0526316 -0.97 0.33 -0.154429 0.051883
lag1_k_outcome 0.3171835 0.115111 2.76 0.006 0.0915701 0.5427968
lag2_k_outcome -0.3702924 0.2344428 -1.58 0.114 -0.8297918 0.089207
lag1_k_correctbelief -0.1384324 0.0809213 -1.71 0.087 -0.2970352 0.0201704
lag2_k_correctbelief 0.0887798 0.1298335 0.68 0.494 -0.1656891 0.3432488active -0.0382159 0.2335549 -0.16 0.87 -0.4959751 0.4195433
lastweekwork 0.03813 0.0695005 0.55 0.583 -0.0980885 0.1743485
pers2extreme 0.116937 0.1854155 0.63 0.528 -0.2464707 0.4803447
pers3extreme -0.0247177 0.1051457 -0.24 0.814 -0.2307995 0.1813641
satisfaction 0.0951164 0.1846367 0.52 0.606 -0.2667649 0.4569978
politicsextreme 0.105328 0.0594406 1.77 0.076 -0.0111734 0.2218294
religionlow -0.0080779 0.1295819 -0.06 0.95 -0.2620538 0.245898
state1inter -0.3165468 0.1272724 -2.49 0.013 -0.5659961 -0.0670974
sex 0.2769388 0.2092608 1.32 0.186 -0.1332048 0.6870825
f2 * sex -0.1710259 0.3703786 -0.46 0.644 -0.8969546 0.5549028
f3 * sex -0.1037912 0.2596019 -0.4 0.689 -0.6126016 0.4050191
f4 * sex -0.3269753 0.2352115 -1.39 0.164 -0.7879814 0.1340308
familysize -0.0888129 0.1332295 -0.67 0.505 -0.3499379 0.1723122
f2 * famsize 0.1597172 0.2916016 0.55 0.584 -0.4118114 0.7312459
f3 * famsize 0.0815818 0.1404871 0.58 0.561 -0.1937679 0.3569315
f4 * famsize 0.0637374 0.1689667 0.38 0.706 -0.2674312 0.394906
lottery 0.0878997 0.0946651 0.93 0.353 -0.0976404 0.2734399
f2 * lottery 0.0006981 0.1296213 0.01 0.996 -0.253355 0.2547511
f3 * lottery -0.0607023 0.1000839 -0.61 0.544 -0.2568632 0.1354585
f4 * lottery -0.0590698 0.0993719 -0.59 0.552 -0.2538351 0.1356954
riskaversion 0.108991 0.1796689 0.61 0.544 -0.2431535 0.4611355
f2 * riskaversion 0.0242155 0.24313 0.1 0.921 -0.4523106 0.5007416
f3 * riskaversion 0.3298615 0.2135837 1.54 0.122 -0.0887549 0.7484779
f4 * riskaversion 0.2821822 0.2433968 1.16 0.246 -0.1948667 0.759231
cognitive -0.0398538 0.1825077 -0.22 0.827 -0.3975623 0.3178547
f2 * cognitive 0.0625958 0.1944096 0.32 0.747 -0.31844 0.4436316
f3 * cognitive 0.0390203 0.1810991 0.22 0.829 -0.3159275 0.3939681
f4 * cognitive 0.0320654 0.1881907 0.17 0.865 -0.3367816 0.4009123
inequality 0.3516115 0.3056063 1.15 0.25 -0.2473659 0.9505889
f2 * inequality -0.1238701 0.2927759 -0.42 0.672 -0.6977004 0.4499602
f3 * inequality -0.1199847 0.364656 -0.33 0.742 -0.8346973 0.5947279
f4 * inequality 0.0057669 0.4056232 0.01 0.989 -0.7892399 0.8007738
statement2 -0.0687859 0.0716844 -0.96 0.337 -0.2092848 0.071713
f2 * statement2 -0.1545406 0.1114499 -1.39 0.166 -0.3729784 0.0638973
f3 * statement2 0.074145 0.0966341 0.77 0.443 -0.1152543 0.2635444
f4 * statement2 0.0402586 0.0944877 0.43 0.67 -0.1449339 0.2254511
statement5 0.1075585 0.0427933 2.51 0.012 0.0236852 0.1914319
f2 * statement5 -0.0672796 0.036966 -1.82 0.069 -0.1397317 0.0051724
f3 * statement5 -0.161848 0.0770723 -2.1 0.036 -0.3129069 -0.0107892
f4 * statement5 0.0072845 0.0913236 0.08 0.936 -0.1717065 0.1862756
statement7 -0.0184342 0.0687607 -0.27 0.789 -0.1532026 0.1163343
f2 * statement7 0.0584533 0.133594 0.44 0.662 -0.203386 0.3202927
f3 * statement7 0.0225581 0.0822566 0.27 0.784 -0.138662 0.1837781
f4 * statement7 -0.0231589 0.0775287 -0.3 0.765 -0.1751124 0.1287946
Cut-off values: cut1 = .058 (.633), cut2 = 2.832 (.614)
Note:  N = 1963, chi2 = 415.46 (p = 0)
Fit: McFadden R2 = .185, Cox - Snell R2 = .323, McKelvey and Zavoina R2 = .378, Count R2 = .620. 
              Table 3. Belief evolution: Estimation Results.f 1 2 3 4
k 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 .77 .31 .02 0 0
1 2 .21 .42 0 .08
3 0 .99 0
1 .05 .17 .05 0
2 2 .77 0 0
3 0 0
1 0 .15 .01





Table 4. Pairwise test of treatment e⁄ects: P-values.
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